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CLAIM RE-CONSTRUCTION: THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS
IN THE POST -MARKMAN ERA
by
John R. Thomas·
In the post-Markman era, the Federal Circuit has focused attention on
the public notice function ofpatent claims in equivalents cases, and it has
come to emphasize precision and accuracy in claim drafting. This
Article argues that recent judicial emphasis on the public notice function
of patent claims is an inappropriate innovation policy. The demand for
highly refined patent claims increases patent acquisition expenditures
that are unlikely to increase social welfare, cause patent rights to be
distributed unevenly, and are inconsistent with the structural features of
the patent system.
This Article presents two mechanisms to accommodate the doctrine of
equivalents in the post-Markman era. One is the reinvigoration of the
reissue proceeding. The other is allowing judicial amendment of patent
claims during infringement litigation proceedings, much like the
longstanding British practice. This shift would allow courts to pursue the
policy goals of Markman for literal and equivalent infringement alike.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The jury is still out on whether the policy aspirations that animated the
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. opinion have been achieved. I That the
characterization of claim interpretation as a matter of law has made literal
infringement determinations more deliberative, better articulated, and more

• Professor of Law, Georgetown University. My thanks to the participants in the Tenth
Annual Lewis & Clark Law School Fall Business Law Forum, entitled "Markman v.
Westview Instruments: Lessons from a Decade of Experience," for their many helpful
comments on this piece.
I 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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consistent remains an open question. 2 Plainly, however, these benefits have not
been obtained with respect to non textual infringement. Infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents continues to be characterized as a question of fact. 3 It
therefore remains possible that two manufacturers of an identical product could
be accused of infringing the same patent, yet be subject to conflicting
infringement judgments in the courts.
The incompatibility of the doctrine of equivalents with Markman's policy
goals may partially explain the increasing disdain with which the Federal
Circuit has viewed arguments of equivalent infringement. 4 As the Federal
Circuit has focused attention upon the public notice function of patent claims, it
has come to emphasize precision and accuracy in the drafting exercise. s
Originally incorporated into patent instruments in order to expand the rights of
inventors,6 claims have been reconceived as a mechanism for curtailing the
,
.
.
7
patentee s propnetary mterest.
Given the recent decline of the doctrine of equivalents, it is troubling that
patent proprietors dissatisfied with their choice of wording have been left to
two other moribund alternatives. The administrative reissue procedure remains
obscure. Even though contemporary Federal Circuit opinions read less like the
majority opinion in Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v. Linde Air Products
Co} and more like Justice Black's famous dissent, few patentees seek reissue. 9
The continued disuse of reissue in the post-Markman era speaks volumes about
the perceived speed and effectiveness of this post-grant proceeding. Recent
Federal Circuit case law has also placed severe constraints upon the ability of
the judiciary to correct claims during litigation. 10
Limitations upon the ability of patentees to expand their claims, no matter
what the mechanism, arise from a common policy argument. The courts have
reasoned that claims should provide clear notice to competitors of the scope of
the patentee's asserted rights, and to stray from their exact wordin y may offend
the reliance interests of others. 11 Although long acknowledged, 2 the public
2 See, e.g., Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent
Cases?, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. I (2001).
3 See, e.g., Nystrom v. Trex Co., 374 F.3d 1105, 1110 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("Infringement,
whether literal or under the doctrine of equivalents, is a question of fact.").
4 See, e.g., Kelly D. Talcott, Intellectual Property Under Siege-Federal Circuit Takes
Another Swipe at the Doctrine a/Equivalents, N.Y.L.J., June 15,2004, at 5.
5 See, e.g., Sage Prods., Inc. v. Devon Indus., Inc., 126 F.3d 1420, 1425 (Fed. Cir.
1997) ("This court recognizes that such reasoning places a premium on forethought in patent
drafting. Indeed this premium may lead to higher costs of patent prosecution.").
6 See John F. Duffy, The Festo Decision and the Return 0/ the Supreme Court to the
Bar a/Patents, 2002 SUP. CT. REv. 273, 308.
7 See Toro Co. v. White Consolidated Indus., Inc., 383 F.3d 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
8 339 U.S. 605, 612 (1950).
9 Of the 187,017 patents procured in 2003, only 421 were reissue patents. See PATENT
TECH. MONITORING DIV., U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. PATENT STATISTIC
CHART: CALENDAR YEARS 1963-2003, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/aclido/oeip/taf/
us_stat.htrn (last visited Nov. 1,2004) [hereinafter U.S. PATENT STATISTIC CHART].
10 Chef Am., Inc. v. Lamb-Weston, Inc., 358 F.3d 1371, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
II See, e.g., M. Scott Boone, Defining and Refining the Doctrine 0/ Equivalents: Notice
and Prior Art, Language and Fraud, 43 IDEA 645, 663 (2003) ("The policy of fair notice to

HeinOnline -- 9 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 154 2005

2005] DOCTRlNE OF EQUIVALENTS IN THE POST-MARKMAN ERA

155

notice function of claims has only recently had dramatic doctrinal
consequences. 13 This shift has significant implications upon the care with
which patent instruments should be prepared, the value of issued patents, and
ultimately, the innovation policies that inspire the patent system.
Skeptical over the recent emphasis upon the public notice function of
patent claims, as well as the resulting implications for the doctrine of
equivalents, this Article considers alternative mechanisms for reconciling the
doctrine of equivalents with Markman. Part I of this Article offers an
introduction to the law and policy of nontextual infringement. Part II reasons
that recent judicial emphasis upon the public notice function of patent claims is
an inappropriate innovation policy. The demand for highly refined patent
claims portends drastic increases in patent acquisition expenditures that are
unlikely to increase social welfare, cause the breadth of patent rights to be
distributed on an uneven basis, and are inconsistent with structural features of
the patent system.
Part III considers other mechanisms to accommodate the doctrine of
equivalents in the post-Markman era. One option is the reinvigoration of the
administrative reissue proceeding. Taking a page from longstanding British
practice, this Article also explores the possibility of judicial amendment of
patent claims during infringement litigation. Replacing the doctrine of
equivalents with "judicial reissue," accompanied by intervening rights available
to adjudicated infringers, would upset the hoary patent law maxim that courts
may not amend patent claims. 14 Yet this shift would allow courts to pursue the
Markman goals of deliberation, articulation, and conformity within the context
of literal and equivalent infringement alike. Part IV is a conclusion.
II. CONSTRUING MARKMAN
The Markman opinion secured its place as a central text of modern patent
law by defining a protocol for determining the scope of patent claims.
However, the Markman interpretational methodology does not tell the entire
story of judicial determinations of patent scope. Although the proprietary rights
awarded to a patent proprietor are based upon a patent's claims, they are not

the public is based on the idea that a patent, especially the claims of a patent, put the public
on notice as to what the scope of the patent is."); Gretchen Ann Bender, Uncertainty and
Unpredictability in Patent Litigation: The Time is Ripe for a Consistent Claim Construction
Methodology, 8 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 175, 214 (2001) ("The statutory language and history
plainly require the patentee, who alone controls the claim language, to sufficiently and
clearly claim the invention and to inform the public of the scope of the claim.").
12 See, e.g., Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 347 (1853) (Campbell, J.,
dissenting).
13 See Nicole S. Robbins, The Curtailment of the Doctrine of Equivalents: Courts
Emphasize the Public Notice Function of Patent Claims, 35 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 323 (2001).
14 See, e.g., Quantum Corp. v. Rodime, PLC, 65 F.3d 1577, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
("Although we construe claims, if possible, so as to sustain their validity ... it is well settled
that no matter how great the temptations of fairness or policy making, courts do not redraft
claims. "); Becton Dickinson & Co. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 922 F.2d 792, 799 n.6 (Fed. Cir.
1990) ("Nothing in any precedent permits judicial redrafting of claims.").
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entirely confined to them. Courts may also employ the doctrine of equivalents
to expand the reach of a patent's claims beyond their literal language. 15 Even
though the doctrine of equivalents has a long history in U.S. law,16 courts
continue to struggle in their efforts to identify when its use is appropriate and
precisely what its contours should be.
The current policy framework for discussing the doctrine of equivalents
remains deeply rooted in the 1950 Supreme Court decision in Graver Tank &
Manufacturing Co. v. Linde Air Products CO. 17 There, the Supreme Court
majority described a doctrine of equivalents founded upon fairness and
utilitarian justifications. The Court observed that confining patent rights to
cases of literal infringement would merely encourage competitors to make
minor changes to the claimed invention, thereby profiting from the teachings of
the patent but avoiding the patent owner's proprietary interest. Such a "fraud on
a patent" would not only be unjust to the patent proprietor, but it would also
encourage inventors to forgo the patent system in favor of trade secrecy. IS
Justice Black's dissenting opinion offered a different perspective upon the
doctrine. To expand a patentee's rights beyond the precise wording of the
claims, he explained, would impose a stifling burden of uncertainty upon free
enterprise: 9 Justice Black also believed that the judiciary's free hand in
applying the doctrine of equivalents would eviscerate the reissue statute. He
noted, in particular, that an infringer of a reissued patent may qualify for an
intervening right to employ the patented invention. 2o Because an equivalent
infringer is subject to all the remedies available under the Patent Act, however,
patentees would seem to have few incentives to seek reissue rather than rely
upon the doctrine of equivalents in court.
The dialectic in Graver Tank was therefore one of rules versus standards.
The majority opinion favored a standards-oriented doctrine of equivalents that
was amenable to judicial discretion. The majority reasoned that limiting patent
scope to the bright-line rule of literal infringement would encourage behavior
to the boundaries of prohibited conduct and prevent the fine-tuning needed to
reach wise judgments in individual cases. In contrast, the dissent contended that
formally realized claims provided competitors with the certainty necessary to
order their affairs in an efficient fashion. The dissent might also have added, in
the tradition of the rules-standards debate, that constraining the doctrine of
equivalents would encourage inventors to draft claims with more care, thereby
limiting a moral hazard problem. 21
Like most disputes over rules and standards, this exchange of views was
not especially productive. The very structure of the debate left the justices
without a way to integrate their views into a coherent legal principle. The lower
15 Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Interface Architectural Res., Inc., 279 F.3d 1357, 1367
(Fed. Cir. 2002).
16 See Duffy, supra note 6, at 307-10.
17 339 U.S. 605 (1950).
18 !d. at 608.
19 !d. at 617 (Black, J., dissenting).
20 The intervening rights statute is codified at 35 U.S.c. § 252 (2000).
21 See generally Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REv. 379 (1985).
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courts, and especially the Federal Circuit, were left to assess these competing
concerns in particular cases. The response was not so much a balancing as a
marked preference for a rules-based or standards-based approach to nontextual
infringement at any particular moment in time. Interestingly, although it was
strictly a literal infringement case, the Markman decision marked a turning
point in Federal Circuit equivalents jurisprudence as well.
Prior to Markman, Federal Circuit equivalents cases emphasized fairness
to the patentee over the public notice function of claims. In particular, the
court's early cases held that the doctrine of equivalents could permissibly be
employed to correct applicant drafting errors. Among many examples, the well
known decision in Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States stands out. 22 Although
the applicant did not draft claims to the full extent of a patent's disclosure
within the confines of the teachings of the prior art, the Federal Circuit
nonetheless awarded him the shortfall via an equivalency theory.
The Hughes Aircraft case involved the so-called Williams patent, which
related to a synchronous communications satellite. In order to control the
position of the satellite, information about the satellite's position and
movement was gathered and analyzed. The claims of the Williams patent
required that the satellite transmit this data to an external location-namely, a
ground crew-which would then retransmit control signals back to the satellite.
Because the accused satellites took advantage of on-board computers to
complete some of the calculations, they did not literally infringe the Williams
patent?3
The Federal Circuit nonetheless concluded that the accused satellites
infringed the Williams patent under the doctrine of equivalents. Chief Judge
Markey reasoned that using an on-board computer to perform the required
calculations was the "modem-day equivalent" of providing data to the ground
crew for the same purpose. 24 This was the case even though "Williams did not
submit claims broadly covering all ground controllable spacecraft, as he might
have. Had he done so ... literal infringement would have been present here.,,25
The analysis quoted heavily from the majority opinion in Graver Tank, giving
short shrift to possible public reliance upon the specific choice of words found
in the claims. 2
Over time, the Federal Circuit began to retreat from the enthusiastic view
of the doctrine of equivalents evidenced in Hughes Aircraft. In opinions such as
Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc.,27 the Federal Circuit began to place
more emphasis upon the public notice function of claims. The Penn walt
decision confirmed the "All Elements Rule": The principle that the doctrine of
equivalents must be established to each claim limitation rather than the claimed
invention as a whole. 28 The All Elements Rule discounted the availability of the
22
23

24

25
26
27

28

717 F.2d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
/d. at 1357-58.
/d. at 1365.
/d. at 1363.
Id. at 1365-66.
833 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chern. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 19 (1997).
HeinOnline -- 9 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 157 2005

158

LEWIS AND CLARK LAW REVIEW

Vol. 9:1

doctrine of equivalents as a mechanism for correcting claim-drafting errors;
instead, it emphasized that "the limitations defining the invention tell the public
what it can make, use, or sell without violating the patentee's rights.,,29
The public notice functi9n of claims grew even more prominent once the
Federal Circuit issued its Markman opinion. 3o Among other rationales, the
Federal Circuit reasoned that claim construction should be decided as an issue
of law because competitors should "be able to ascertain to a reasonable degree
the scope of the patentee's right to exclude.,,3l In the well-known decision in
Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc.,32 the Federal Circuit also identified the
public notice function of patent claims as buttressing the previously established
demarcation between intrinsic and extrinsic evidence. If the public record of
patent documents could be distorted by extrinsic evidence introduced at trial,
the Federal Circuit reasoned, then competitors would be less able to "review
the public record, apply the established rules of claim construction, ascertain
the scope of the patentee's claimed invention and, thus, design around the
claimed invention.,,33 Thus, both significant aspects of the Markman decisionthe categorization of claim construction as an issue of law and the ordering of
intrinsic and extrinsic evidence-were premised, at least partially, upon a
policy of public notice.
When the Supreme Court later affirmed the Markman holding, Justice
Souter partly relied upon the premise that judges, rather than juries, were better
suited to construe patent claims. 34 So it came as a surprise when the Court's
next patent case, issued only one year after Markman, continued to characterize
the doctrine of equivalents as presenting a question of fact. In WarnerJenldnson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical CO.,35 the Court did drop a footnote
suggesting that the Federal Circuit "implement procedural improvements to
promote certainty, consistency, and reviewability to this area of the law.,,36
Given the Federal Circuit's lack of authority to oversee the district courts,37 as
well as its role as a court of review, this advice was certainly misdirected.

Pennwalt Corp., 833 F.2d at 949.
Craig Allen Nard, Process Considerations in the Age of Markman and Mantras,
2001 U. ILL. L. REv. 355, 360 ("The importance of the notice function of the patent claim
has always been appreciated or, at least, undcrstood by judges on the Federal Circuit and its
predecessor, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. It was not until the 1995 en banc
Federal Circuit decision in Markman... that it reached the forefront of patent law
jurisprudence. ").
31 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 978 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
32 90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
33 Id. at 1583.
34 517 U.S. 370, 388-89 (1996).
35 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
36 Id. at 39 n.8.
37 See, e.g., In re Mark Indus., 751 F.2d 1219, 1222 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ("This court has
no administrative authority over any district court."); In re Oximetrix, Inc., 748 F.2d 637,
643 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ("This court lacks the general authority over district courts exercisable,
for example, under 28 U.S.c. § 332."); Petersen Mfg. Co. v. Cent. Purchasing, Inc., 740 F.2d
1541, 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ("Unlike other Circuit Courts of Appeal, we have no direct
supervisory authority over district courts.").
29

30
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Unsurprisingly, in the seven years since Warner-Jenkinson, the Federal Circuit
has yet to follow through on the Court's proposal.
Federal Circuit response to the uneasy fit between Markman and
nontextual infringement has not been innovative procedural refonn, but rather
ad hoc substantive restrictions upon the doctrine of equivalents. The increasing
emphasis upon prosecution history estoppel 38 and the newly minted public
dedication doctrine of Johnson & Johnston Associates, Inc. v. R.E. Service
CO. 39 are perhaps the court's more notable mechanisms for restricting the
doctrine of equivalents. However, the Federal Circuit has also stressed the
obligation to claim precisely an inventor's asserted proprietary interest. 4o
Emblematic of the cases is the well-known post-Markman opinion in Sage
Products, Inc. v. Devon Industries, Inc. 41
In Sage Products, the asserted patent claimed a disposal container for
depositing hazardous medical waste. Rather than describing the invention in
broad functional tenns, the patent's claims were drafted toward a specific
structure. In particular, the claims required that the container include two
specific features: a slot (through which the waste was inserted) located at the
top of container, and a "first constriction extendin,g over said slot" (to prevent
users from touching previously inserted waste). The accused device was
constructed somewhat differently, with the slot located within, rather than on
top of, the container body, and the barrier consisting of a hinged member that
did not constrict over the slot. Under these circumstances, the Federal Circuit
refused to apply the doctrine of equivalents, explaining:
[F]or a patentee who has claimed an invention narrowly, there may not be
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents in many cases, even
though the patentee might have been able to claim more broadly. If it
were otherwise, then claims would be reduced to functional abstracts,
devoid of meaningful structural limitations upon which the public could
rely .
. . . [A]s between the patentee who had a clear opportunity to negotiate
broader claims but did not do so, and the public at large, it is the patentee
who must bear the cost of its failure to seek protection for this
foreseeable alteration of its claimed structure.43

38 See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 344 F.3d 1359 (Fed.
Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 2018 (2004).
39 285 F.3d 1046 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
40 See, e.g., Moore U.S.A., Inc. v. Standard Register Co., 229 F.3d 1091, 1106 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (rejecting argument of equivalent infringement where the claim called for
adhesive strips placed along a "majority" of the length of an envelope, while the accused
product placed strips at 47.8% of the length, the court reasoned that "it would defy logic to
conclude that a minority-the very antithesis of a majority--could be insubstantially
different from a claim limitation requiring a majority, and no reasonable juror could find
otherwise").
41 126 F.3d 1420 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
42 /d. at 1422.
43 !d. at 1424-25.
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With its disavowal of the doctrine of equivalents as an error correction
mechanism, Sage Products stands in high relief to early Federal Circuit cases.
Previously, the Federal Circuit viewed a patentee's ability to claim the accused
44
product literally as favoring a conclusion of equivalent infringement. Today, a
patent proprietor is barred from asserting equivalent infringement as to
disclosed, but unclaimed subject matter. 45
Cases such as these demonstrate that increasing the emphasis upon the
public notice function of patent claims has had significant doctrinal
implications. In the post-Markman era, Federal Circuit jurists can still say that
"we protect the inventive contribution of patentees, even when the drafting of
their patents has been less than ideal,,,46 but only when they are discussing the
claim definiteness doctrine. 47 The Court's discussion concerning the
appropriate scope of patent rights has instead come to stress not fairness to the
inventor, but rather warning to the public. 48 The strength of this trend, as well
as its increasing impact upon legal doctrine, justifies further reflection upon the
public notice function of patent claims. This Article takes up this topic next.
III. DECONSTRUCTING PATENT CLAIMS AND PUBLIC NOTICE

Public accessibility is an intuitively resonant and deeply embedded value
in the U.S. legal system. From Sarbanes-Oxley to secured transactions to
government in the sunshine, we can concur with the observation of Justice
Brandeis that "[s]unlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the
most efficient policeman.'.49 Notice of the patentee's proprietary interest has
long been considered of equal importance within intellectual property law,
providing industrial actors with guidance as to both permissible and
inappropriate activities. 5o Innovation policy is said to compel the conclusion
that the issued patent instrument should provide clear notice to the public of the
,
.
.
51
patentee s propnetary mterest.
Despite the conviction and frequency with which this statement is made,
however, it has never been the law that the claims provide the entirety of the
metes and bounds of the patent right. 52 Historically, of course, the concept of
the doctrine of equivalents preceded the development of claiming practice in

See supra text accompanying notes 22-26.
Johnson & Johnston Assoc., Inc. v. R.E. Servo Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1054--55 (Fed.
Cir.2002).
46 Exxon Research & Eg'g CO. V. United States, 265 F.3d 1371,1375 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
47 35 U.S.c. § 112, para. 2 (2000).
48 Graver Tank & Mfg. Co.v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605, 612 (1950).
49 LoUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY 92 (1914).
50 See Craig Allen Nard, Certainty, Fence Building and the Usefol Arts, 74 IND. L.J.
759, 759-{50 (1999).
51 See Martin J. Adelman & Gary L. Francione, The Doctrine of EqUivalents in Patent
Law: Questions that Pennwalt Did Not Answer, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 673,682 (1989).
52 See, e.g., Coming Glass Works V. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1257
(Fed. Cir. 1989) ("A claim in a patent provides the metes and bounds of the right which the
patent confers on the patentee to exclude others from making, using, or selling the protected
invention. ").
44

45

HeinOnline -- 9 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 160 2005

2005] DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS IN THE POST-MARKMAN ERA

161

the United States. When claims began routinely appearing in patent
instruments, it was not because of an outpouring of cries for a greater degree of
public notice from patent instruments. Rather, formalized claiming practice
coincided with the reestablishment of patent examination procedures in the
1836 Act. Concise summaries of the asserted invention served only the modest
goal of easing the tasks associated with patent administration. 53
Even the elevation of claims in the 1870 Act did not convert claims into
the sole measure of patentee rights. 54 Industry remained aware that the courts
might apply the doctrine of equivalents to extend infringement liability beyond
the literal wording of the claims. This state of affairs continues today. Even at a
time where the doctrine of equivalents is less than what it once was, proprietary
rights may be awarded to the full extent of a patent's inventive contribution,
guided by the teachings of the prior art and the concessions yielded in the
prosecution history.
Some of the practical workings of the patent system further suggest that
publicizing the precise scope of a patentee's proprietary rights is not the
preeminent policy goal it is sometimes made out to be. The U.S. patent system
is unique among industrialized nations by continuing to lack a full-fledged pregrant publication regime. The Domestic Publication of Foreign Filed Patent
Applications Act of 1999 requires the PTa to publish pending patent
applications eighteen months from the earliest filing date to which they are
entitled. 55 However, if an applicant certifies that the invention disclosed in the
application will not be the subject of a patent application in another country
that requires publication of applications eighteen months after filing, then the
application will not be published. As a result, some, but certainly not all, patent
applications are published prior to the day the patent becomes legally
enforceable. 56
This piecemeal publication regime makes it possible for each of us to be
sued for infringement with no possible forewarning of the existence of the
asserted patent, not to mention the particular language of the claims. Indeed,
patent groprietors not uncommonly enforce their rights on the day a patent
issues. This reality certainly dims the rhetoric that the public is entitled to

53 See T. Whitney Chandler, Prosecution History Estoppel, the Doctrine ofEquivalents,
and the Scope ofPatents, 13HARV. J.L. & TECH. 465, 468-69 (2000).
54 See Harold C. Wegner, Equitable Equivalents: Weighing the Equities to Determine
Patent Infringement in Biotechnology and Other Emerging Technologies, 18 RUTGERS
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1, 18 (1992).
55 35 U.S.C. § 122(b) (2000).
56 See generally Reiko Watase, The American Inventors Protection Act of 1999: An
Analysis of the New Eighteen-Month Publication Provision, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J.
649 (2002).
57 See, e.g., Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916, 918 (Fed. Cir.
2004); Plant Genetic Sys., N.V. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 315 F.3d 1335, 1337 (Fed. Cir.
2003); United Sys. of Ark., Inc. v. Laser Substrates, Inc., No. 01-1224, 2002 WL 243448
(Fed. Cir. Feb. 19, 2002); Robotic Vision Sys., Inc. v. View Eng'g, Inc., 112 F.3d 1163,
1164 (Fed. Cir. 1997); GAF Bldg. Materials Corp. v. Elk Corp. of Dallas, 90 F.3d 479, 480
(Fed. Cir. 1996); National Presto Indus., Inc. v. West Bend Co., 76 F.3d 1185, 1193 (Fed.
Cir. 1996).
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notice of claim scope. But even for patents that are published prior to grant, or
that are enforced later in their term, identification of their relevance and
appraisal of their precise scope is not a straightforward proposition.
One initial difficulty is the tendency of contemporary industry toward
patent portfolio practice. Even small innovative firms are decreasingly likely to
hold merely a patent or two. They instead have acquired extensive patent suites.
Nearly 300 firms acquired at least 1000 patents between 1977 and 2003, for
example, with the heaviest PTO user, the IBM Corporation, procuring 35,341
patents during this period. Overall, the PTO granted 187,017 patents in 2003, as
compared to 109,746 in 1993. This staggering growth in patent acquisition
shows no sign of abating: in 1993 inventors filed 188,739 applications at the
PTO; 366,043 applications were filed in 2003. 58
These patents collectively present an enormous amount of industrial
regulation. Sorting through this volume of text presents a complex challenge, a
task made more difficult by the unreliable PTO patent classification system. 59
Patents on business methods and software are well-known to have been
scattered across many classifications,6o but incorrect classifications are not
uncommon for more traditional technologies as weIl. 61 Interested parties have
little choice but to consult the entire PTO oeuvre, for limiting inquiry to the
relevant categories in the Manual of Patent Classification is a precarious
searching strategy.
Longstanding claiming practices also increase the difficulty of assessing
patents. Patent attorneys often write in fields that lack consistent technical
terminology. In contrast to patents arising in biotechnology and chemistry, for
example, business method and software patents are more prone to describing
the identical technical feature using different words. 62 Exacerbating these
difficulties is the ability of the drafter to coin his own terms to include in
c1aims. 63 This "lexicographic privilege" has been justified on the inability of
existing language to characterize innovative products and processes. 64

58 U.S. PATENT STATISTIC CHART, supra note 9, at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/
ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm.
59 John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Who's Patenting What? An Empirical
Exploration ofPatent Prosecution, 53 V AND. L. REv. 2099 (2000).
60 John R. Allison & Emerson H. Tiller, The Business Method Patent Myth, 18
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 987 (2003); John W. Bagby, Business Method Patent Proliferation:
Convergence of Transactional Analytics and Technical Scientifics, 56 Bus. LAW. 423 (2000).
61 Allison & Lemley, supra note 59, at 2102.
62 See Jay P. Kesan, Carrots and Sticks to Create a Better Patent System, 17

BERKELEY. TECH. L.J. 763, 784 (2002) (,,[P]atentees used different terminologies (based on
their individual organizations) to refer to the .same underlying technique. This makes the
problem of locating relevant prior art even more difficult. ... [T]he English language is a
blunt instrument to describe computer software.").
63 See, e.g., Bell Atl. Network Servs., Inc. v. Covad Communications Group, Inc., 262
F.3d 1258, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
64 Autogiro Co. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 397 (Ct. CL 1967) ("Often the
invention is novel and words do not exist to describe it. The dictionary does not always keep
abreast of the inventor. It cannot. Things are not made for the sake of words, but words for
things. To overcome this lag, patent law allows the inventor to be his own lexicographer.").
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Unfortunately, it also results in idiosyncratic claim limitations that can require a
great deal of effort to decipher.
The Federal Circuit's permissive posture toward the definiteness standard
further undermines the public notice of patent claims. The Patent Act requires
claims "particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter
which the applicant regards as his invention.,,65 Yet in recent years the Federal
Circuit upheld a claim calling for fibers that are "substantially completely
wetted" over a definiteness challenge. 66 A claim directed toward treating a
catalyst for a "period 'sufficient to increase substantially the initial catalyst
activity'" was likewise confirmed. 67 Perhaps the most extreme example was a
claim reciting concrete "hardened sufficiently to allow cutting by a ... saw,
while still producing an acceptable surface finish," which also withstood
scrutiny for indefiniteness. 68 Such a lenient definiteness jurisprudence suggests
that patent claims do not always provide neatly defined markers of the
patentee's proprietary interest.
The uncertainty of judicial claim construction also casts considerable
doubt upon the notion that the public can reliably read claims in order to
determine the scope of the patentee's proprietary interest. A telling number of
recent Federal Circuit claim interpretation decisions have issued with a
dissent. 69 Other results seem quite unpredictable. In one recent opinion the
Federal Circuit reasoned that the claim term "acid" meant "salt" -a conclusion
7o
with which any sophomore chemistry major would take considerable issue.
Yet, in another case, the Federal Circuit refused to substitute the term "at" for
"to" in a claim calling for "heating ... dough to a temperature in the range of
about 400 F. to 850 F.," even though even a novice baker would realize that
7l
dough this hot would be virtually incinerated.
Another practical factor detracting from a high degree of public notice in
patent claims is that, in practice, the patent regime permits savvy inventors to
manipulate the claims of issued patents. Although neither post-grant proceeding
is often used, both reissue and reexamination allow changes to patent claims
0

65
66
67

0

35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 2 (2000).
LNP Eng'g Plastics, Inc. v. Miller Waste Mills, Inc., 275 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
Exxon Research & Eng'g Co. v. United States, 265 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir.

2001).
Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal Indus., Inc., 145 F.3d 1303, 1306
(Fed. Cir. 1998).
69 See, e.g., Nystrom v. Trex Co., 374 F.3d 1105, 1119 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Goldenberg v.
Cytogen, Inc., 373 F.3d 1158, 1169 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of
Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Housey Pharm., Inc. v. Astrazeneca
UK Ltd., 366 F.3d 1348, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Microsoft Corp. v. Multi-Tech Sys., In",
357 F.3d 1340, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Schwarz Pharma, Inc. v. Warner-Lambert Co., No.
03-1384, 2004 WL 193228, at *6 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 29, 2004); Liquid Dynamics Corp. v.
Vaughn Co., 355 F.3d 1361, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Golight, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
355 F.3d 1327, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
70 Merck & Co. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 347 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
71 Chef Am., Inc. v. Lamb-Weston, Inc., 358 F.3d 1371, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(emphasis added).
68
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after they have issued. 72 So-called "continuation practice"-where inventors
maintain a series of continuation applications at the PTO-provides another
vehicle for inventors to obtain additional claims that make up for shortcomings
in previously issued patents. 73 Even for those firms that diligently conduct
freedom to operate searches, commission invalidity and noninfringement
opinions from patent counsel, and attempt to design around the claims of
existing patents, it is simply unknowable whether next week's issue of the PTO
Official Gazette will thwart their investment-backed expectations or not.
Of course, many of these factors are cited against patentees in the claim
construction literature. Because inventors can draft claims as they see fit, obtain
virtually as many claims as they are willing to pay for, and even amend the
patents they have already procured, many commentators believe that it is only
fair that inventors should claim their inventions precisely.74 By the same token,
however, these capabilities also depress the public notice function of patent
claims. The patent system is effectively a fluid regulatory environment, and
placing great reliance upon the wording of anyone patent's claims is a perilous
commercial strategy.
Finally, other patent law doctrines actively discourage the public to read
patents. Consulting the patent literature has been likened to a "dangerous sport"
due to the doctrine of willful infringement. 75 Reading a patent may well result
in costly duties to ascertain the scope of its claims and consider their
applicability to one's own activities. 76 Failure to fulfill these oblipations may in
tum subject the reader to enhanced damages for infringement. 7 Although the
Federal Circuit has recently mitigated some of the harshness of willful
infringement doctrine,78 the conflict with the public notice function of patent
claims remains. 79 The doctrine of inducement infringement80-with its
requirement that the indirect infringer have knowledge of the patent81 -further

72 See Stephen G. Kunin & Anton W. Fetting, The Metamorphasis of Inter Partes
Reexamination, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 971 (2004).
73 35 U.S.c. § 120 (2000). See Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse
of Patent Continuations, 84 B.U. L. REv. 63 (2004).
74 E.g., Paul M. Janicke, Heat of Passion: What Really Happened in Graver Tank, 24

ATPLAQ). I (1996).
75 Edwin H. Taylor & Glenn E. Von Tersch, A Proposal to Shore Up the Foundations
of Patent Law that the Underwater Line Eroded, 20 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 721
(1998).
76 Crystal Semiconductor Corp. v. TriTech Microelectronics Int'l, Inc., 246 F.3d 1336,
1351 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ("When an infringer has actual notice of a patentee's rights, the
infringer has an affirmative duty of due care to avoid infringement. ").
77 35 U.S.c. § 284 (2000).
78 Knorr-Bremse Systeme fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337,
1343-44 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
79 See Mark A. Lemley & Ragesh K. Tangri, Ending Patent Law's Willfulness Game,
18 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 1085, 1092-93 (2003).
80 35 U.S.c. § 271(b) (2000).
81 See Mickowski v. Visi-Trak Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 171, 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (a
patentee must "prove that the defendant acted with knowledge of the patent infringed" under
§ 271(b»; Young Dental Mfg. Co. v. Q3 Special Prods. Inc., 891 F. Supp. 1340, 1348 (E.D.
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encourages industry to avoid reading patent claims, no matter how artfully they
are drafted.
As a practical matter, the patent system cannot credibly be said to have
emphasized the public notice function of patent claims. In circumstances where
the patent regime could have ensured greater public access to claims, it instead
adopts mechanisms that are more convenient to administer or serve other policy
goals. The fluidity of the patent regulatory regime also reveals that only a
foolhardy finn would place great reliance upon the particular wording of a
modest number of patent claims. The most diligent search strategy might have
overlooked other patents, other relevant patent applications may remain on the
PTO docket, and claim interpretation remains an unpredictable endeavor. The
demand for precision claim drafting cannot overcome significant structural
features of the patent regime that create industrial uncertainty.
We could, of course, contemplate legal refonns that would provide the
public with a level of notice of claims consistent with the rhetoric of claim
interpretation jurisprudence. Many observers have already suggested that we
adopt an ecumenical pre-grant publication system. 82 More serious consideration
could be given to a prior user rights regime, based on acts perfonned prior to
the first publication date of patent claims in reasonably fmal fonn. 83 For good
measure, we could consider legal refonn for the standards of claim
definiteness, willful infringement, and claim drafting. The point of this Article
is not to advocate these refonns, however, but rather to point out how far we
must go to validate contemporary judicial attitudes towards claim scope.
Even without regard to the pragmatics of the patent system, however,
emphasis upon the public notice function of patent claims would remain a
troubling innovation policy. Patent instruments have long been acknowledged
as exceedingly difficult texts to draft properly. As the Supreme Court
recognized in its 1892 decision in ToplifJv. Topliff,
The specification and claims of a patent, particularly if the invention be at
all complicated, constitute one of the most difficult legal instruments to
draw with accuracy, and in view of the fact that valuable inventions are
often placed in the hands of inexperienced persons to prepare such
specifications and claims, it is no matter of surprise that the latter
frequently fail to describe with requisite certainty the exact invention of
the patentee, and err either in claiming that which the patentee had not in
fact invented, or in omitting some element which was a valuable or
essential part of his actual invention. 84
This statement was written at a time when the patent system was the
province of the manual and mechanical arts of the nineteenth century. It is hard
to imagine that claim drafting has somehow become a more straightforward

Mo. 1995) ("[T]he accused infringer must be shown to have had actual knowledge of the
patent and the actual intent to induce the infringement.").
82 E.g., Watase, supra note 56, at 649.
83 See Paul R. Morico, Are Prior User Rights Consistent with Federal Patent Policy?:
The U.S. Considers Legislation to Adopt Prior User Rights, 78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC'y 572 (1996).
84 145 U.S. 156, 171 (1892).
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endeavor in the Federal Circuit era. The diversity and dizzying complexity of
contemporary innovation, the broader reach of patentable subject matter, and
the brisker pace of technological advancement render prescient claim drafting
an ideal far more difficult to achieve today.85
Yet what was once seen as a lamentable shortcoming of the patent system
has today been reconceived as a virtue. The patent law's balance between
encouraging innovation and preserving competition now appears to depend
upon the consistent underrepresentation of inventors by the patent bar. This
policy is troubling because it advises drastic increases in patent acquisition
expenditures that are unlikely to increase social welfare, and because it causes
the breadth of patent rights to be distributed on an uneven basis, heedless of
industrial policy.
Among the Federal Circuit's more troubling recent advice is its suggestion
that inventors and tatent attorneys should devote additional efforts towards
patent acquisition. 8 An apparent difficulty with this approach is that industry
has been steadily pursuing this course for the past two decades. Since the
advent of the Federal Circuit, more patents are being obtained than ever before,
the attention paid to patents in business transactions and corporate boardrooms
has dramatically increased, and public interest in the patent system is arguably
at an all-time high. 87 For all of this, the case law evidences no reduction in the
complexities of patent claim scope determinations.
We should also recall that only a small number of issued patents are
subject to litigation or commercial transactions. As Mark Lemley has already
asserted, even modest increases in patent acquisition expenditures are unlikely
to be cost-effective. 88 Indeed, that small subset of patents that are being
enforced may already fulfill the Federal Circuit demand for more careful
acquisition efforts. Research by John Allison, Mark Lemley, Kimberly Moore,
and Derek Trunkey reveals that litigated patents incorporate more claims and
89
spend longer periods of time in prosecution than non-litigated patents. The
claims the Federal Circuit construes are therefore already more likely to have
been prepared with greater deliberation, and at a higher cost, than those of the
average patent instrument. 9o That even these heightened efforts persistently
come up short suggests that claim drafting remains the difficult professional
task that the Supreme Court described over a century ago.
The notoriously poor correlation between patenting and R&D further
suggests that higher patent-based transaction costs are unlikely to be socially
85 See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The Growing Complexity of the United
States Patent System, 82 B.U. L. REV. 77, 135 (2002).
86 See, e.g., Sage Prods., Inc. v. Devon Indus., Inc., 126 F.3d 1420, 1425 (Fed. Cir.
1997).
87 See Robert D. Taylor, Twenty Years of the Federal Circuit: An Overview, in I PLI's
EIGHTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 9 (PLI Intellectual Prop.
Course, Handbook Series No. E-716, 2002).
88 See Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REv.
1495,1511 (2001).
89 John R. Allison et aI., Valuable Patents, 92 OEO. LJ. 435, 451,459 (2004).
90 See F. Scott Kieff, The Case for Registering Patents and the Law and Economics of
Present Patent-Obtaining Rules, 45 B.c. L. REv. 55, 101-02 (2003).
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efficient expenditures. John Barton has already pointed out, for example, that
the number of intellectual property attorneys has grown faster than the amount
of research over the past two decades. 91 Other studies show that while
innovative enterprises have filed an increasing number of patent applications
since the early 1980s, they have not increased R&D spending over the same
time frame. 92 These data suggest that dramatic increases in claim drafting
expenditures are unlikely to be socially efficient, particularly when assessed
against the poorly executed goal of public notice of claim scope.
Commentators have sought other justifications in favor of precision claim
drafting, however, including one that relies upon the notion of comparative
efficiencies. This position relies on the view that patent proprietors stand in the
best position to detennine the appropriate scope of their claims. For example,
Michael Meurer and Craig Nard assert that "[p ]otential infringers are usually
poorly positioned compared to the inventor to judge whether an embodiment
would be blocked by enablement or prior arts constraints.,,93 Polk Wagner has
reasoned similarly, stating that "[a]mong the 'parties' to the patent transaction,
the patentee is either the best infonned or the one who can most easily and
cheaply become the best infonned about the context of her innovation.,,94
Where the patent proprietor is necessarily the entity that can provide
infonnation about claim scope at the lowest cost, judicial emphasis upon welldrafted claims seems a plausible proposition.
Whether the patentee knows his patent best is not an entirely certain
assertion, however. Accused infringers are, after all, not merely casual
observers of the patent system. They are putatively putting the patented
invention to some use themselves. They may well have developed its product
on their own, unaware of the patent they are accused of infringing, and
presumably they possess at least some knowledge about the invention and the
state of the art. Indeed, it is not uncommon in patent cases for accused
infringers to invalidate an asserted ,fsatent by relying upon their own
publications, sales, or other activities. 5 In such cases, surely this patentdefeating infonnation was more readily provided by the defendant than the
patent proprietor.

John H. Barton, Reforming the Patent System, 287 SCIENCE 1933, 1933 (2000).
Bronwyn H. Hall & Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, The Patent Paradox Revisited: An
Empirical Study of Patenting in the
Semiconductor Industry, 1979-1995, 32 RAND J.
ECON. 101, 102 (2001); JAMES BESSEN & ERIC MASKIN, SEQUENTIAL INNOVATION, PATENTS,
AND IMITATION (Mass. Inst. Tech. Economics Working Paper No. 00-01, 1999),
http://www.researchoninnovation.org!patent.pdf.
93 MICHAEL J. MEURER & CRAIG ALLEN NARD, INVENTION, REFINEMENT AND PATENT
CLAIM SCOPE: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS 53 n.265 (Boston
Univ. Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 04-03, 2004)
(Case Sch. of Law, Research Paper Series in Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 04-05,
91

92

u.s.

2004), http://www.ssm.com/abstract=533083.
94 R. Polk Wagner, Reconsidering Estoppel: Patent Administration and the Failure of
Festo, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 159,213 (2002).
95 See, e.g., Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift Eckrich, Inc., 375 F.3d 1341, 1352-53
(Fed. Cir. 2004).
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Further, most accused infringers are patentees themselves. 96 They are
likely to be familiar with at least the rudiments of the patent system and its
principles of claim construction. To the extent we do observe asymmetries in
patent litigation, the most common scenario involves large corporate
defendants being sued by individuals or small firms that are not otherwise
involved in the marketplace for the patented invention. 97 In these circumstances
the most efficient information provider is likely the accused infringer rather
than the plaintiff-patentee. As the Markman opinion itself recognized,98 that a
patent owner is ordinarily the least-cost information provider concerning claim
scope is not an entirely satisfactory account.
Placing a premium upon artful claim drafting also distributes the scope of
patent rights on an uneven basis. The quality of patent claims varies, of course,
because drafters possess differing degrees of legal competence and technical
foresight. It is nonetheless an extremely difficult task to assess the capabilities
of a particular claim drafter beyond a rudimentary level. In this rarefied field,
identifying cues of professional competence may prove difficult even for
sophisticated enterprises. The most reliable measure of drafters' skills, the
litigation track record of their patent claims, is virtually never available. Only a
small percentage of patent claims are litigated, and only a fraction of those
asserted ever receive a full-blown construction by the judiciary.99 Absent
unusual circumstances, this construction will take place many yearssometimes decades-after the claims were initially submitted to the PTO. lOO
Even the PTO realized that assessing claim drafting skills is quite difficult.
Recently, the PTO abandoned the claim drafting portion of its registration
examination in favor of a series of multiple-choice questions. IOI The official
explanation for the shift was that the examination was too time-consuming to
grade,102 although persistent complaints were heard about the subjectivity and
inconsistency of PTO exam scoring as well. PTO difficulties with respect to a
simplified, stylized claim drafting exercise suggest more daunting concerns for
competitive enterprises in high-tech industry. Suboptimally drafted claims may
arise not from applicant shirking, but rather from a persistent and widespread
inability to discern good claim drafters from bad. Judicial stress upon the

ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R. THOMAS, PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW § 2.10 (2004).
See Mark D. Janis, Reforming Patent Validity Litigation: The "Dubious
Preponderance, " 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 923, 923 n.1 (2004).
98 52 F.3d at 983 ("[T]he testimony of Markman and his patent attorney on the proper
construction of the claims is entitled to no deference.").
99 See Lemley, supra note 88, at 1501.
100 See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of
Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 236 tbl.ll (1998) (concluding that it takes over
twelve years on average from the time a patent application is filed to the time litigation is
completed).
101 See Registration Examination for Patent Practitioners and the Establishment of a
Continuing Legal Education Requirement and an Annual Fee for Registered Patent
Practitioners, 61 Fed. Reg. 51,072, 51,073 (Sept. 30,1996).
102 See Changes to Representation of Others Before the United States Patent and
Trademark Office, 69 Fed. Reg. 35,428 (June 24, 2004) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pts. 1,
10-11).
96
97
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individual skills of the claim drafter may be founded on a demand for due
diligence by patent proprietors, but it seems particularly prone to arbitrary
claim scope detenninations and incoherent industrial policy.
All of this is not to say that the public notice function of patent claims
lacks any significance. Patent professionals conduct freedom-to-operate
searches and draft opinion letters on a daily basis.103 All things being equal, it
would be preferable if these tasks could be conducted expeditiously based upon
well-drafted claims, rather than the combination of the prior art, prosecution
history, and patent instrument as a whole. The long history of our patent system
suggests that patent professionals have consistently failed to draft claims of
optimal scope, however, and that imposing more onerous obligations upon
them is unlikely to enhance social welfare. Judicial focus upon the public
notice function of patent claims has not resolved the problems inherent to claim
drafting, but it has cast severe doubt upon the traditional vehicle courts used to
address these shortcomings. This Article next considers prospects for an
accommodation between the sensibilities of the post-Markman era, on one
hand, and the policy foundations of the doctrine of equivalents on the other.
IV. RECONSTRUCTING CLAIMS
Since Markman, courts have struggled to give effect to the traditional
fairness and utilitarian justifications for the doctrine of equivalents, while at the
same time encouraging more deliberative, better articulated, and more
consistent claim interpretations. Current judicial emphasis upon the public
notice function of patent claims proves unpersuasive due to inconsistency with
the structural features of the patent regime and troubling implications for
innovation policy. This Article briefly explores two other possibilities for
reconciling the doctrine of equivalents with Markman: the prospect of judicial
amendment of patent claims during enforcement litigation and reinvigoration of
the statutory reissue proceeding.

A. Judicial Amendment ofPatent Claims
A productive way to engage the nontextual infringement policy is to revisit
the Supreme Court's decision in Graver Tank. 104 Here the majority stressed the
benefits of a standards-based principle of nontextual infringement, with Justice
Black more enamored with a rules-oriented emphasis upon literal infringement
and the availability of reissue. 105 That the doctrine of equivalents remains
among patent law's most controversial doctrines reveals that this conversation
was not of great use to the patent community.106 The majority and dissent
103 See Mark A. Lemley & Ragesh K. Tangri, Ending Patent Law's Willfulness Game,
18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1085, 1092-93 (2003).
104 Graver Tank & Mfg. Co.v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950).
105 See supra text accompanying notes 17-19.
106 Hon. Paul R. Michel, The Role and Responsibility of Patent Attorneys in Improving
the Doctrine of Equivalents, 40 IDEA 123, 123 (2000) (describing the doctrine of
equivalents as "the most difficult and least predictable of all doctrines in patent law to
apply").
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talked past each other, leaving the reader with no way to synthesize their views
into a plausible middle ground.
Although the Graver Tank jurists seemed locked into irreconcilable
positions, there was a possibility for compromise. The Court might have
approved of continued judicial application of the doctrine of equivalents on the
condition that equivalent infringers enjoy intervening rights commensurate with
the reissue statute. The same equitable powers that allowed courts to employ
the doctrine of equivalents in the first place could also be employed to fashion
an appropriate remedy in individual cases. 107
The proposal that courts employ equitable remedies in equivalents cases is
not a new idea. Judge Helen Nies sU~ffiested this approach to an equivalents
case in her dissent in Hilton Davis, 8 and Paul Janicke has persuasively
elaborated upon her proposal.I09 Under this concept of a ')udicial reissue,"
equivalency determinations could be made contingent upon allowing the
defendant some capability to continue employing the infringing product or
process. Judicial precedent discussing equitable intervening rights suggests
different factors the courts could consider:
• Whether the availability of the infringing product would improve
social welfare due to its lower cost, technological advantages, tendency
to promote competition, or other factors.
• The extent of the infringer's investment in the patented technology.
• Whether the infringer possessed actual notice of the asserted patent
and planned its affairs accordingly.
• The ease with which the infringer can "design around" the patent in
order to again participate in the relevant market.
• The degree of equivalence between the claimed invention and the
adjudicated infringement.
• Whether the patent proprietor learned of the accused infringement and
failed to seek reissue within the two-year statutory period.
• Whether the patent's claims were drafted with reasonable care. I 10
The prospect of "judicial reissue" would effectively create a flexible
remedial scheme that would apply to nontextual infringement cases. Such an
approach would ease the usual absolutism of a finding of patent infringement.
Empowered to establish what are effectively degrees of infringement liability,
courts would be better able to account for the unique circumstances of

107 Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Interface Architectural Res., Inc., 279 F.3d 1357, 1367
(Fed. Cir. 2002) ("[T]he doctrine of equivalents is an equitable doctrine .... ").
108 See Hilton Davis Chern. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1560 (Fed.
Cir. 1995) (en banc) (Nies, J., dissenting).
109 Paul M. Janicke, When Patents Are Broadened Midstream: A Compromise Solution
to Protect Competitors and Existing Users, 66 U. ON. L. REv. 7, 48 (1997).
110 See J. Christopher Carraway, The Uncertain Future of Enforcing Patents that Have
Been Broadened Through Reissue, 8 FED. CIR. B.J. 63, 68-70 (1998); Jonathan A. Platt,
Protecting Reliance on the Patent System: The Economics and Equities of Intervening
Rights, 47 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 1031, 1055-67 (1997); P.J. Federico, Intervening Rights in
Patent Reissues, 30 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 603, 604 (1961).
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particular cases. III It would also offer courts a more practical way to effect
innovation policy than the blunt formulation of the current doctrine of
equivalents. Rather than discuss innovation and competition merely as detached
policy preferences, courts would be able to balance these concerns within the
context of individual decision making.
This reformulated non textual infringement mechanism would also address
one of the perceived problems of our current doctrine of equivalents. In an
environment where courts routinely correct drafting errors through
infringement doctrines, patent attorneys may possess diminished incentives to
prepare patents with a reasonable level of care. I 12 The desire to avoid remedial
restraints would encourage patentee incentives to draft claims correctly and
reduce incentives for shirking.
The concept of tempering the doctrine of equivalents with reissue-like
remedial limitations has many virtues. Yet it does not fully reconcile the
doctrine of equivalents with the demands of the post-Markman era.
Infringement under the doctrine of equivalents continues to be characterized as
a question of fact. 113 Equivalent infringement therefore remains a jury issue that
is resolved without explanation. Further, given the deferential standard of
review for factual determinations,"4 the Federal Circuit might theoretically be
required to affirm conflicting determinations of equivalent infringement. Under
current law, one firm could be judged a non infringer, while another that
manufactures the identical product could be held to be an equivalent infringer,
subject to all the remedies available under the Patent Act.
Building upon this proposal, another alternative would call for the
judiciary not merely to mimic the statutory intervening rights provisions of the
reissue statute. Power to conduct reissue proceedings could instead be vested in
the courts, either exclusively or as an alternative to the PTO. Rather than assert
equivalent infringement as a question of fact, patentees would be required to
formally amend their patent instrument to include claims that literally covered
the accused device. In tum, the adjudicated infringer would be able to assert
absolute or equitable intervening rights as currently stated in the reissue
statute. I 15

III Cf Maureen A. O'Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 1177, 1241 (2000) ("To the extent that a jury or judge is reluctant to enter an
all-for-nothing holding of invalidity, fair use offers another option. It provides for a
judgment that the patent is valid and infringed but that infringement is excused, sometimes
for free.").
112 Wagner, supra note 94, at 222-24; Kieff, supra note 90, at 120.
113 E.g., Nystrom v. Trex Co., 374 F.3d 1105, 1110 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("Infringement,
whether literal or under the doctrine of equivalents, is a question of fact.").
114 See Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1370
(Fed. Cir. 2004) ("The standard of review for this court is whether substantial evidence
supports the jury's finding.").
115 35 U.S.c. § 252 (2000).
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At first blush, this scheme may appear to add an intolerable level of
complexity to patent enforcement litigation. I 16 Current judicial assignments are
not so far off from this proposal, however. In the post-Markman era, courts
may adopt claim constructions advocated by neither the patent proprietor nor
the accused infringer. ll7 They may declare a patent infringed even though the
accused product or process falls outside the literal scope of the claims. 118
Additionally, they may even draft hypothetical patent claims. 119 Formal
amendment of the claims issued by the PTO may be a more modest step than it
may initially appear.
This approach would also overturn the venerable tenet that courts may not
redraft patent claims. 120 Although this principle is billed as a self-evident axiom
in the United States, formal amendment of patent claims has in fact been a
121
working reality for British patent jurists since at least 1835. Under British
practice, some of these amendments consist merely of the deletion of claims
122
that have been held invalid, analogous to domestic statutory disclaimers. Yet
a U.K. court is also able to make a so-called "'validating' amendment,"
consisting of "writing into the claim a feature not found in any other claim in
order to validate, or at least strengthen it, against a possible attack.,,123
Although requests to amend claims during patent infringement litigation
are commonplace,124 British patent owners do not get an entirely free lunch in
these circumstances. One consequence of patent amendment is that "no
damages shall be awarded in proceedings for an infringement of the patent
committed before the decision to allow the amendment unless the court or the
comptroller is satisfied that the specification of the patent as published was
framed in good faith and with reasonable skill and knowledge.,,125 The u.K.
patent statute therefore accounts both for patentee shirking and for third party
reliance interests. Borrowing from the more sophisticated intervening rights

116 Such concerns suggest that the primary practical function of patent claims is not to
provide public notice of the scope of the patentee's rights, but rather to expedite patent
litigation once those rights have been asserted.
117 See J.T. Eaton & Co. v. Atl. Paste & Glue Co., 106 F.3d 1563, 1568-70 (Fed. CiT.
1997); Exxon Chern. Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp., 64 F.3d 1553, 1557-58 (Fed. CiT.
1995).
118 See Ericsson, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 352 F.3d 1369, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
119 See Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677,68485 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
120 See, e.g., Quantum Corp. v. Rodime, PLC, 65 F.3d 1577, 1584 (Fed. CiT. 1995)
("Although we construe claims, if possible, so as to sustain their validity ... it is well settled
that no matter how great the temptations of fairness or policy making, courts do not redraft
claims."); Becton Dickinson & Co. v. c.R. Bard, Inc., 922 F.2d 792, 799 n.6 (Fed. Cir.
1990) ("Nothing in any precedent permits judicial redrafting of claims.").
121 See Palmaz's European Patents, [1999] R.P.C. 47, 59 (Patents Ct.) (U.K.).
122 35 U.S.C. § 253 (2000).
123 Instance v. Ccl Label Inc., [2002] F.S.R. 27 para. 2 (Patents Ct.) (U.K.); see also
Petrolite Holdings Inc. v. Dyno Oil Field Chems. UK Ltd., [1998] F.S.R. 646 para. 9
(Patents Ct.) (U.K.) (,"Validating' amendments" are "effected by writing a new allegedly
valid claim where no corresponding claim existed before.").
124 Palmaz's European Patents, [1999) R.P.C. at 59.
125 Patents Act, 1977, c.37, § 62(3) (U.K.).
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principles found in the U.S. Patent Act could achieve the same benefits
domestically. 126
The impact of British amendment practice should not be overstated. It has
never been exclusive of a nontextual infringement theory. 127 Further,
amendment of claims during litigation is in principle founded more upon
validity than enforcement concerns. 128 The British experience nonetheless
shows that judicial amendment of patent claims is a legitimate possibility for
accommodating the doctrine of equivalents within the post-Markman era.

B.

Reforming Reissue

Another vehicle for reconciling Markman and the doctrine of equivalents
is a more effective reissue proceeding. 129 One option is to increase the
attractiveness of reissue by default, through the abolition of the doctrine of
equivalents. This step would seemingly encourage patentees to make use of
administrative opportunities, such as reissue or continuation applications, in
130
order to expand upon overly cabined claims.
Existing distinctions between the doctrine of equivalents and reissue
suggest that this option is not an entirely attractive one. In particular, the
reissue statute incorporates a number of restrictions that do not apply to the
doctrine of equivalents. Among them is the two-year limitations period for
broadening the scope of the patent claims. 131 Presumably, this deadline was
intended to promote industrial certainty by providing a date certain beyond
which the claims could not be administratively broadened. In practice,
however, two years is an entirely arbitrary period. Cunning use of continuation
practice allows patentees effectively to ignore this restriction,132 and of course
the doctrine of equivalents remains available throughout the term of the patent.
Adjudicated infringers are also able to seek intervening rights no matter when
the reissue application was filed. 133 With the reissue proceeding having fallen
virtually into a state of desuetude, the current two-year limitations period
deserves reconsideration.
A second apparent shortcoming is the reissue statute's current proscription
134
against the introduction of new matter into reissue applications. The prospect
of unforeseen, after-arising technologies has been a persistent theme in Federal

See 35 U.S.C. § 252 (2000).
Free World Trust v. Electro Sante Inc., [2001] F.S.R. 45 para. 28 (Can.) (discussing
similarities and distinctions between United States doctrine of equivalents and patent claim
scope principles under Commonwealth law).
128 Palmaz's European Patents, [1999] R.P.C. at 59 ("The purpose of making an
amendment to a patent is to avoid a finding of invalidity.").
129 See Allen G. Ahera, Expanding the Reissue Procedure: A Better Way to Do
Business,1 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 185, 218 (1993).
130 See Joshua D. Sarnoff, Abolishing the Doctrine of Equivalents and Claiming the
Future After Festo, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1157, 1158 (2004).
131 35 U.S.C. § 251, para. 4 (2000).
132 See Lemley & Moore, supra note 73, at 65.
133 35 U.S.C. § 252 (2000).
134 35 U.S.c. § 251, para. 1.
126
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Circuit discussion concerning the doctrine of equivalents. 135 Indeed, for many
observers, this scenario represents the only compelling case for a nontextual
infringement theory. 136 However, the reissue proceeding is utterly inapplicable
in cases of subsequently developed technologies, because the Patent Act does
not allow patent proprietors to account for them by amending their
specifications. The current judicial mindset about the doctrine of equivalents
suggests a rethinking of this statutory constraint as well.
Additional statutory features may further discourage use of reissue and
further distance this proceeding from the doctrine of equivalents. Although
current PTO regulations require patent proprietors to profess only a single error
in order to commence reissue proceedings,137 subsequent dialogue with the
examiner is not limited to this shortcoming. 138 A more narrow scope to reissue
may increase predictability and resort to reissue by patent proprietors. Further,
although issued patents enjoy a statutory presumption of validity,139 this
presumption is erased once the patent is resubmitted to the PTO. 140 Given that
examiners are already tasked with generating a prima facie case of any
invalidity rejections they raise,141 retaining a presumption of validity during
reissue proceedings may be more appropriate.
Finally, the PTO is far more solicitous of third party inputs for reissue
applications than it is for ordinary applications. The PTO publishes an
announcement of a reissue application in its Official Gazette, and will then
ordinarilr delay further consideration of that application for a two-month
period. 14 Third parties are then invited to file protests against the reissue
application. The PTO has also reasoned that since reissue applications are not
subject to the Patent Act's eighteen-month publication provisions, the statutory
prohibition a¥ainst pre-grant oppositions does not apply to reissue
proceedings. 14 As a result, the PTO will accept third-party protests until such
time as it formal7 notifies the patent proprietor that the reissue application has .
been approved. 14

135 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 344 F.3d 1359, 1369, cert.
denied, 124 S. Ct. 2018 (2004).
136 See SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Excel Phann., Inc., 356 F.3d 1357, 1364 (Fed.

Cir. 2004) ("[T]he quintessential example of an enforceable equivalent, after-arising
technology, would always be unclaimable new matter. In that sense, the doctrine of
equivalents compensates for the patentee's inability to claim unforeseeable new matter.").
But see MEURER & NARD, supra note 93, at 53 n.265.
137 37 C.F.R. § 1.175 (2004).
138 37 C.F.R. § 1.176 (2004).
139 35 U.S.c. § 282 (2000).
140 In re Sneed, 710 F.2d 1544, 1550 nA (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("[C]laims in a reissue
application enjoy no presumption of 'validity. ", (citing In re Doyle, 482 F.2d 1385, 1392,
(Cust. & Pat.App. 1973)).
141 In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d 1468, 1472 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
142 U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT
EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1441 (8th ed., Tev. 1 Feb. 2003) [hereinafter MANUAL OF PATENT
EXAMINING PROCEDURE].
143 35 U.S.C. § 122(c) (2000).
144 MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, supra note 142, § 1441.0 I.
HeinOnline -- 9 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 174 2005

2005] DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS IN THE POST-MARKMAN ERA

175

Interestingly, the terse reissue statute does not describe any of these unique
administrative features. Given the atypical origin of reissue proceedings-the
nineteenth century Patent Office began conducting reissue proceedings without
even a trace of legislative or judicial imprimatur-this state of affairs is not
unusual as an historical matter. 145 These longstanding administrative practices
may be chilling patentee resort to reissue, however. Although few would
contest the desirability of providing the PTO with the most relevant
information for making patentability determinations, it should be noted that the
PTO established the current reissue mechanisms long before the availability of
reexamination proceedings. 146 Perhaps it is time to consider disengaging
opposition-style procedures from reissue, glVen the availability of
reexamination today.
Given these significant procedural, temporal, and remedial distinctions
between the doctrine of equivalents and reissue, the current case for wholly
abolishing one in favor of the other is weak. 147 However, to the extent that
judicial precedent or legislative reform brings greater symmetry between the
two, consolidation of these vehicles for post-grant patent claim amendments
may be in order. Comparative institutional competence will likely be the
deciding factor between the administrative reissue proceeding and the judicial
doctrine of equivalents.
V. CONCLUSION
The rapid decline of the doctrine of equivalents was perhaps the least
predictable consequence of the seminal Markman opinion. Elevation of the
public notice function of claims and emphasis upon the duties of the drafter
have left little room for a nontextual theory of patent infringement. This Article
has instead called for a more realistic judicial posture towards the public notice
function of patent claims. Allowance for judicial amendment of patent claims,
along with reinvigoration of the statutory reissue proceeding, would enable us
to retain, rather than reject, the traditional policy goals for the doctrine of
equivalents, and to do so in a way that is in keeping with our post-Markman
sensibilities.

145

146
147

See Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 218 (1832).
35 U.S.C. §§ 302-307 (2000).
See MEURER & NARD, supra note 93, at 43.
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